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For the purpose of the bilateral exchange, this paper will consist four parts: (I) the 
Evolution o f “ASEAN Plus Three” (APT); (II) Challenges Ahead for APT; (III) the 
Impacts of APT on Taiwan; and (IV) Some Observations and Recommendations 
for the Evolution of Cross-Strait Relations.
(I) The Evolution ASEAN Plus Three (APT)
Before the Second World War, in 1940 Japan initiated the “Greater East Asian Co- 
Prosperity Zone” with the aim to establish a new regional order, with Japan and 
Manchuria as the centre. However, the initiative was aborted with Japan’s defeat in 
1945. The post-war Yoshida Doctrine renounced militarism and avoided a heavy 
military expenditure. Instead, Japan single-mindedly devoted her talents, resources, 
and energy to a rapid economic reconstruction and export-led growth. Japan adhe- 
red to the role o f a merchant State. When the Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka visited 
Southeast Asia in 1974, anti-Japanese riots erupted in Thailand and Indonesia. 
Tokyo’s foreign policy establishment realized that the image o f Japan as a self- 
serving economic organism had become a liability in the region. Although the Fu- 
kuda Doctrine of 1977 did not succeed, it reflected an aspiration o f the then Japan 
to play a more active political role by “bridging” the non-communist ASEAN na- 
tions and the communist Indochina states. In the meantime, the four post-War de- 
cades found a stable Asian market mechanism with its manifestation articulated in 
the “flying geese theory”. In 1990, Malaysia proposed an “East Asian Economic
Caucus” without the “Caucasians”, which was aborted with the U.S. objection and 
Japan’s following suit. In 1996, the Clinton-Hashimoto Joint Declaration sealed the 
U.S.-Japan strategie partnership in the regional security.
The outbreak o f the Asian financial crisis in September 1997 gave birth to the 
inaugural ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Summit. At the second summit in 1998, a 26- 
member East Asian Vision Group (EAVG) was established to study and advise on 
a long-term regional cooperation. At the third summit in December 1999, the le- 
aders agreed to make the meeting permanent, and eight areas for cooperation were 
identified in the Joint Statement, which included economy, currency and finance, 
human resource development, and the development cooperation. In 2000, the 
Chiang Mai Initiative was postulated, which had two components. An “ASEAN 
Swap Arrangement” originally put forward in 1977 was to be expanded to cover all 
ten current members, and it inereased in size from US$200 million to US$1 billion. 
The other, a more important, one is a network of bilateral swap agreements which 
was to be set up between individual ASEAN members and the “plus three” coun­
tries. Furthermore in 2000, priorities for economic cooperation were set up on the 
ąuestion of information and communication technology, SMEs and trade/investment; 
moreover, an envisaged APT FTA is to be studied, which might include six FTAs, 
namely the ASEAN Plus China, ASEAN Plus Japan, ASEAN Plus Korea, Japan- 
China FTA, Japan-Korea FTA, and China-Korea FTA.
In 2001, after the accession to the WTO, China made an active move to 
formally establish the 26-member Boao Forum for Asia (BFA), and had the per­
manent Secretariat set up in Boao, China. This presumably symbolized China’s 
capability to lead the regional forum. What followed was the ASEAN Plus China 
Agreement in 2002, aiming at establishing an FTA between China and the 
ASEAN6 by 2010, and furthermore the ASEAN10 by 2015.
At the 6th APT Summit in 2002, an Asian Economic Community, proposed 
by Japan, was meant to be gradually formalized with the existing APT dialogue, 
with concrete measures the scope of which went beyond economic and financial 
cooperation and covered politics, security, environment, energy, culture, education, 
and social cohesion.
Furthermore, in lieu o f the progress on the front of the ASEAN Plus China, 
Japan and ASEAN signed the Tokyo Declaration in December 2003, aiming at 
establishing the ASEAN Plus Japan FTA by 2012. Beginning with Japan’s 2003 
Whitepaper on Trade, by way of the continuation of Japan’s strategies for regional 
cooperation FTAs with ASEAN and Korea first, and then the APT were to be si­
gned, and then a link was to be made with Taiwan.
As to ASEAN Plus Korea, it is expected that a Framework Agreement on 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership between ASEAN and Korea should be si­
gned in October 2005, which would include a zero-tariff scheme for 80% of the 
bilateral trade in goods, and negotiations on services trade and investment to be 
discussed in 2006.
It has been noted that in 2003, China’s trade deficits with Taiwan, Japan, 
and Korea registered US$14.7 billion, US$40.4 billion, and US$20.3 billion, re- 
spectively; whereas China’s trade surpluses with the U.S. and the European Union 
reached US$58.6 billion and US$19.1 billion, respectively. In other words, China’s 
eaming from trade with the West went to Asian neighbours’ pockets. Furthermore, 
with the steady progress made in APT, there have been extemal interests and inter- 
nal discussions which entertained various possibilities of an expanded membership, 
including the ASEAN Plus Five (with Australia and New Zealand; or rather Hong 
Kong and Taiwan perhaps), or ASEAN Plus Three Plus Three, otherwise ASEAN 
Plus Six, i.e. a vision of the inclusion of Australia, New Zealand, and India, or 
what have you.
Given the occurrence of the Asian financial crisis, the rise of Asian con- 
science, China’s accession to the WTO and the growing confidence in taking up an 
active regional role, Japan’s keeping abreast with the regional engagement, Korea’s 
growing sense of catching up, and ASEAN’s continuous interest in serving as the 
“hub” rather than “spokes” in the process of the regional economic cooperation, it 
seems that the APT is marching towards institutionalisation. In addition to the 
Summit initiated in 1997, the APT today boasts of annual meetings of Economic, 
Foreign, Labour and Agricultural Ministers, as well as the senior officials’ level 
meetings -  by the name of East Asia Study Group -  to coordinate the APT coope­
ration agenda. The futurę development of APT, at its current agreed pace, could 
form the biggest FTA in the world by 2015, with a total population of 1.98 billion. 
This will certainly provide a new global economic landscape with a tri-polar balan- 
ce of power.
(II) Challenges Ahead for APT
Despite the positive aspects described in the last section, some potential constraints 
and futurę challenges merit our attention.
U.S. Concerns Remain with a Strategie Positioning in Sight
The U.S. strong opposition to the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), proposed 
by Malaysia in 1990, was effective in that Japan and Korea expressed a lukewarm 
attitude thereto then, and thereby the fate of the EAEC was ill aborted. However, 
the Asian conscience, stirred up by the Asian financial crisis, outweighed the ear- 
lier concem, and in effect witnessed the reincamation o f the EAEC in the name of 
the APT. Nevertheless, the U.S. reserved concem and their invisible hand remained 
evident not only in the passive objection to the envisaged Asian Monetary Fund but 
also in the active pursuits o f the Enterprise for the ASEAN Initiative (EAI). The 
EAI aims to encompass bilateral dialogues with ASEAN members so as to sustain 
American commercial interests on the one hand and assist ASEAN in upgrading
production, distribution and coordination. The US-Singapore FTA symbolized the 
U.S. continuous strategie interests in the region. Furthermore, the U.S. maintained 
their bilateral military engagements of various sorts, with Japan, South Korea, 
Taiwan, the Philippines, Australia, Singapore and Thailand in the region. Recently, 
the China-pressuring has been somewhat reminiscent o f the Japan-bashing in the 
1980s. There have been strong calls for China’s currency valuation and policy re­
form in the exchange rate policy. After the lifting o f the textile quota mandated 
under the WTO Uruguay agreement in January 2005, China’s surging export to the 
U.S. has generated threats of retaliation unless China either imposes voluntary 
restraints or levies export tax on their textile produets. The U.S. also pressured the 
EU to follow suit. It seems that the trade war will not go away any time soon.
China’s “Peaceful Rise” Remains Uncertain:
With the accession to the WTO in 2001, China further tumed into the locomotive 
of the regional economic growth. With the nominał GDP ranked the 5Ul in the 
world, China’s stake in the world economy is paramount. China’s aspiration to 
peaceful development, articulated time and again in the policy statements, will be 
showcased in the run-up of the 2008 Olympic Game in China. Therefore, China 
takes a special stance on favouring multilateral cooperation manifested in the “New 
Security.” The concept o f the “New Security” has frequently been articulated in 
China’s policy statements which concem new mandates in the areas of anti- 
terrorism, anti-narcotics, securing energy resources, stabilizing currency and fman- 
ce, etc. The new perception has transcended beyond the traditional military con­
cem. China continues to play an active role in the North Korea issue, the Shanghai 
Cooperation, and in mustering confidence-building campaigns with the neighbours 
surrounding her vast territories. China has also raised an eyebrow on the recent 
US-Japan pronouncement o f Taiwan as their “common security concem.” The 
recent issuing o f the “Anti-Secession Law,” which was meant to crystallize China’s 
stance against Taiwan’s separatist movement, has also aroused indignant senti- 
ments across the Strait, an unfavourable pronouncement from the U.S. and the 
postponement o f lifting the arms embargo by the EU. However, the endorsement of 
the “One China” principle by the leading “Green Camp businessman”, Mr. Hsu 
Wen-Lung, who is both an investor in China and a supporter of the separatist 
movement, and the current and upcoming “peaceful visits” by the opposition par- 
ties’ leaders have certainly tipped off the negative impact of the Law. China has 
dangled the carrot of much-wanted bilateral economic cooperation to Taiwan KMT 
Party Chief Lien Zhang, and will continue to whet Taiwan’s enormous appetites 
for more. Nevertheless, the road of the coming negotiations on “One China” and 
ensuring China’s peaceful development would be a bumpy one, to say the least.
Leadership Competition between China and Japan in the region
The rise of China has created some tension between the two regional powers. Chi­
na objected to Japan’s proposition of establishing an Asian currency immediately 
after the Asian Financial Crisis, and insisted that keeping the Reminbi intact would 
be the best thing for China to do for the region at the time. The competition betwe­
en China and Japan in vying for regional leadership seems only too obvious, and 
sooner or later China and Japan will face the challenge o f competitive balance of 
regional influence and cooperative goodwill for the regional leadership. Japan has 
been a loyal U.S. ally sińce the post-Second-World-War period. Japan has lately 
been inspired to become a “normal nation” by amending the post-War Constitution, 
especially Article 9, which prohibits Japan’s remilitarisation o f non-defence naturę. 
The U.S. have recently backed up Japan’s wish to become a permanent member of 
the U.N. Security Council, but China has not been ready to agree to an expanded 
membership of the Council. Despite her expression of “deep remorse” on the war- 
time atrocity created during the World War recently articulated by Prime Minister 
Koizumi, the actions of textbook treatment on the war time history and the conti- 
nuous visits paid to the war memoriał at the Yasukuni shrine have, according to 
Asian nations, and China in particular, not matched up the words so expressed.
However, given the fact that China has replaced the U.S. as Japan’s largest 
trade partner with the bilateral trade reaching 22 trillion Yuan, and that Japan’s UN 
Security Council dream remained unfulfilled, it is not likely that the worsening of 
the relationship would be forthcoming. Furthermore, the ASEAN members do not 
take the Sino-Japan mild tension seriously, as it serves the purpose of keeping Ja­
pan on its toes and thereby stay engaged in the region.
The intra-ASEAN trade remains stagnant, and the competition with China in 
trade and investment remains real
The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) was established in 1992, but the intra-trade 
dependence among the ASEAN members registered an increase from 18% in 1992 
to 23% in 2002, not highlighting the expanded membership in the span of ten 
years. ASEAN attempts to accelerate its pace of liberalization by three years in 
advance of its original schedules, and to achieve the zero tariff by 2007 for the 
ASEAN 6 and by 2013 for the remaining 4. ASEAN has further selected seven 
industries as priority industries for an earlier development, namely the automobile 
industry, textiles, electronics, IT, medical eąuipments, plastic and tourism. Ho- 
wever, the “Plus three” countries play an indispensable role in most of these indu- 
stnes. In addition, ASEAN’s shares o f export markets to China, the U.S. and Japan 
constitute 7.27%, 17.8% and 15.3% of its total export; whereas China’s shares of 
export markets to ASEAN, the U.S. and Japan constitute 6.78%, 22.7$ and 16.6%, 
respectively. Therefore, there is overlapping in export products as well as a com-
petition in export markets between ASEAN and China. Furthermore, a parallel 
phenomenon could be found in the area of FDI as well. Since 2000, the annual 
inbound FDI flow to China totalled 40 billion, whereas to ASEAN only 8 billion. 
China remains vivid to ASEAN both a threat and an opportunity.
The development levels among APT remain diverse
Let us take the GDP of 2004 as an indicator: there was a 17-times larger disparity 
between the well-to-do Japan (with US$29,400) and Myanmar (with US$1,700). 
Although under the assumption of a high trade dependency and a high degree of 
complementariness, an expanded trade among the APT could be possible, but the 
needs for a structural reform and the seąuencing of the reform could be unstable 
and taxing. The challenges ahead for the economic integration under the circum- 
stances of cultural and linguistic diversity could be tantamount as well. From the 
hindsight, ASEAN’s earlier insistence has its merit in that ASEAN should be the 
hub, whereas the “Plus Three” the spokes in the drive of the hub-and-spokes theory 
toward integration. This is to ensure that there will be more beneficial arrangements 
for the “ASEAN Plus Three” rather for the “Three Plus ASEAN”, so to speak.
The “Plus Three” integration will come in due course, but it is not to be expec- 
ted too early
There is some similarity in the economic conditions of China, Japan and Korea, 
such as big-scale enterprises, strong Steel industry, substantial minerał import, etc. 
They could easily become natural allies in certain negotiations. Currently, the three 
have achieved preliminary consensus on the negotiation items which will include 
only public fmance, macro-economics, and ąuarantines. Compared with the other 
two, Japan is less forthcoming regarding the negotiations among the three, parti- 
cularly dreading a detrimental conseąuence in negotiating the agriculture issue. 
Although Japan and Korea are undertaking bilateral negotiations, the progress is 
somewhat stalled. As to China, Japan has insisted that the time is not ripe, and that 
China first needs to implement her WTO commitments.
The proliferation of FTAs/RTAs may well mitigate the impact of the APT
Under Article XXIV of the WTO, there is a 10-year allowance for favourite treat- 
ments under FTAs. Unless favourable conditions are well negotiated, operationali- 
sed and implemented, the expected benefits may not be accrued. There are curren­
tly 40 plus bilateral and plural FTAs, and 30 plus more under negotiation within 
the Asia-Pacific region. Furthermore, there are cross-continental FTAs, such as the 
US-Singapore, US-Australia, and Korea-Chile ones, etc. with complicated and
diverse favourite treatments, such as Rules of Origin with a “spaghetti-bowl” 
effect. The proposition conceming the establishment o f the FTAAP (Free Trade 
Area of Asia Pacific), which would cover the 21 members of the APEC, was abor- 
ted last year, and may well resurface this year with some die-heart determination. 
All these may well cancel the originally intended outcome of the APT. However, 
we should note that many of the proliferating FTAs are more strategie in outlook 
than solid in substance. Some are meant to function as a counter-force, still others 
as bargaining chip against the desirable others.
The potential constraints listed above are not to be perceived as pouring cold 
water over the sizzling PTA, but could rather be seen as a check-list alert for ma- 
king further efforts in achieving a meaningful outcome.
(III) The Impact of APT on Taiwan
Taiwan has signed an FTA with Panama, a formal diplomatic ally. The actual eco­
nomic benefit is minimal given the Iow starting base in the bilateral trade. Ho- 
wever, the bilateral FTA symbolizes a breakthrough and a declaration in that de- 
spite Chma’s waming against signing the FTA with Taiwan (given Taiwan’s lack 
of de-jure national sovereignty), Taiwan as a WTO member should be eligible to 
enjoy any benefits as other members do while fulfilling her obligations.
So far, Taiwan has been unable to sign any FTAs with the APT members. 
Nor does it seem feasible for Taiwan to be included in the APT unless there is 
a major breakthrough in the cross-strait relationship. China has proposed a China- 
Hong Kong-Macao-Taiwan economic zone, but the “One China” principle has 
been getting in the way. With the consensus built between the CCP and the KMT 
during the KMT Party Leader Lien Zhan’s recent visit, it seems that a bilateral 
economic cooperation arrangement could be entertained if both could be innovative 
about what “One China” means.
According to the Industrial Bureau’s data, other things being equal, if Ta­
iwan were excluded from the APT, the GDP would be reduced by 0.98%, trade 
conditions worsened by 1.14%, and social welfare benefits diminished by US$4.3 
billion. The total industrial productivity would plunge by US$6.97 billion, with 
textile industry suffering the downtum by US$1.95 billion, the plastic industry by 
US$940 million, and the electronic industry by US$710 million. The estimated 
total export would be reduced by US$2.36 billion. Furthermore, the current Ta­
iwan^ investment in China constitutes 74.35% of the total outward investment, 
and Taiwan’s trade dependency on China market has a 24% stake, the biggest share 
among Taiwan’s trade partners. Taiwan’s total trade with ASEAN constitutes 
12.8% of the total trade, with a surplus of US$1.9 billion. No doubt, if Taiwan is 
excluded from the APT, and there is no special bilateral arrangement with China or 
any ASEAN members, Taiwan’s economics would suffer substantively.
(IV) Some Observations and Recommendations for the Evolving Cross-Strait 
Relations
With the dynamie changes in policy formulation and substantive cross-strait ex- 
changes, we should take note not only of the positive evolution but also some ne- 
gative bottlenecks and potential bubbles in the continuous construct for harmonious 
cross-strait relations.
Cross Strait Relations to adjust to a new reality
Taiwan’s cross-strait policy in generał has been evolving from the “No Hastę, Be 
Patient” to “Active Liberalization and Effective Management” after the non- 
partisan “Economic Development Advisory Conference (EDAC)” reached consen­
sus in August 2001. China’s cross-strait policy in generał has evolved into 
“Tougher for the Tough, softer for the Soft”, which in literał terms means being 
even tougher for those with an uncompromising agenda, but being even softer for 
those with a compromising agenda.
Taiwan’s Relations with “Hong Kong, China” and Macao to continue turning 
for the better
With the completion o f the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) 
between Hong Kong, China and the PRC early this year, the triangular economic 
interactions among the PRC, “Hong Kong, China” and ROC have become most 
intriguing. The ROC govemment has initiated extensive contacts and communica- 
tion with various sectors in Hong Kong and Macao to expedite exchanges and co­
operation between Taiwan and these two areas. Taiwan’s representative office in 
Hong Kong (i.e., the Hong Kong Affairs Bureau) has recently set up an office in 
the Chek Lak Kop Airport in Hong Kong. The measures have been revised to faci- 
litate the entry and stay procedures for Hong Kong and Macao residents. In 2001, 
a Taiwan-Macao aviation pact was signed and a reciprocal aviation tax exemption 
agreement was extended. Taiwan is also currently conducting aviation consulta- 
tions with Hong Kong.
To search for the highest common denominators for mutual benefits
The seemingly irreconcilable deadlocks of the PRC’s “One China” policy or Ta- 
iwan’s “Democracy First, Unification Later” requires mutual understanding and 
compromise. If political will exists on both sides across the strait to effect a major 
breakthrough in the deadlock and forge a common denominator, a “Pareto optimal”
approach would have to be in place by either postponing the issue indefinitely with 
own explications, respectively or targeting a timeframe for a revisit when both 
sides are comfortable in the course of time. “One China” or “democracy” should 
not be a prereąuisite for any rational dialogue, all the least so when mutual under- 
standing and domestic consensus building remain a far-fetching joumey to make. 
Democracy, no less than the “One China” issue, reąuires a non-imposing, self- 
generating nurture and transformation from within, and could only serve as one of 
the experience-sharing agenda items in a matured relationship. Any pre-condition 
would render negotiations ill-faith and unproductive. Specific issues, such as a tariff 
concession on agricultural produce, tourist exchange, direct transportation links or 
an ICT cooperation for instance, should be charted out as a priority negotiation 
agenda item.
To forge direct bilateral dialogue without unnecessarily ambiguous messages 
among various parties
Confidence-building between the relevant parties acrossthestrait is an indispensable 
ingredient for a recipe to success. If the necessary ingredient is not sufficient for 
a dialogue, then any third party’ s involvement should be invited to forge a multila- 
teral dialogue. The United States have been a long-time partner o f Taiwan in eco­
nomic, political and security deliberations. With the three communiques between 
the U.S. and the PRC, and the “Taiwan Relations Act” between the U.S. and Ta­
iwan, a bałance is supposed to be maintained so as to ensure regional stability 
across the Strait. Nevertheless, in my humble view, an open dialogue between the 
two parties is of tantamount importance on an informal, if  not on agreed-upon for- 
mal, basis. Taiwan’s amendment to the Cross-Strait Act allows the granting of 
negotiation authorities by the govemment to civilian groups so as to conduct the 
bilateral negotiations. However, if a bilateral dialogue renders impossible in 
a given time, a mutually agreeable third-party or multi-parties engagements in the 
process should be re-considered to drive the dialogue process in a more cool- 
headed fashion and more constructive direction. Any indirect interpretation of 
a phenomenon, with or without a third party’s involvement, seems worst of its kind 
and could create unnecessary cross-strait tensions.
To generate a good-will cross-strait relationship by including, not excluding, 
Taiwan in the regional and international organizations
The security issue has evolved from the traditional, or more narrowly defmed, na- 
tional security issue to a more broadly defmed human security issue. Humań secu­
rity covers areas of basie needs (i.e., food, shelter and health), and human dignity, 
and it ensures that people are free from the fear of lacking jobs, food, medical faci- 
lities, and o f encountering brutal abuses. In the case of the SARS (Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome) in the second quarter of 2005, Taiwan revived the long- 
held aspiration of becoming a member of the World Health Organization (WHO). 
However, Taiwan encountered the PRC’s strong opposition and an arrogant trium- 
phant attitude, which in tum triggered an intensified resentful sentiment at home, 
and a consequential, though after all not sustainable, cali for a nation-wide referen­
dum on Taiwan’s accession to the WHO. Furthermore, at the APEC Leaders’ 
Summit in Thailand, the PRC’s implicit and subtle gestures as usual further illu- 
strated its continuous attempt in diminishing Taiwan’s role with any connotation of 
national sovereignty, such as the dialogue among the foreign ministers in the di- 
scussion of the counter-terrorists measures, etc. Taiwan, with her significant geo- 
political profile in the region, could certainly contribute to the regional security 
environment as a constructive partner. China’s unyielding stance ought to be modi- 
fied in due course so as to not further alienate Taiwanese people, whose hearts 
would eventually determine the futurę of the cross-strait relations. By inclusion, 
China and Taiwan would stand to win in the non-zero-sum game; by exclusion, 
China and Taiwan would both lose in the zero-sum game in the long run, although 
some short-sighted viewers may maintain that China wins with continuous 
suppression of Taiwan’s intemational profile.
